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I 
 
Abstract 
Metamorphic viruses are considered the most dangerous of all computer 
viruses. Unlike other computer viruses that can be detected statically using static 
signature technique or dynamically using emulators, metamorphic viruses change 
their code to avoid such detection techniques. This makes metamorphic viruses a 
real challenge for computer security researchers. In this thesis, we investigate the 
techniques used by metamorphic viruses to alter their code, such as trivial code 
insertion, instructions substitution, subroutines permutation and register renaming. 
An in-depth survey of the current techniques used for detection of this kind of 
viruses is presented. We discuss techniques that are used by commercial antivirus 
products, and those introduced in scientific researches.  
Moreover, a novel approach is then introduced for metamorphic virus recognition 
based on unsupervised machine learning generally and Eigenfaces technique 
specifically which is widely used for face recognition. We analyze the 
performance of the proposed technique and show the experimental results 
compared to results of well-known antivirus engines. Finally, we discuss the 
future and potential enhancements of the proposed approach to detect more and 
other target viruses. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
OMPUTER virus is a self-replicating piece of code that attaches itself to 
other programs and usually requires human interaction to propagate [1]. 
Computer virus is one of many types of malware that are intentionally created to 
harm computer systems. Professionally speaking, malware is short for malicious 
software and it is a general term used to describe any software that is harmful to 
any scale of computer systems [2][3]. Computer malware analysis and detection is 
considered a critical topic in computer security, not only because of the significant 
wide spread of malware, but also because of its economical impact [4]. 
Every year thousands of new malware arise and cost the world billions of dollars. 
A survey conducted by ―ComputerEconomics.com‖ indicated that malware 
economical impact in 2006 exceeded 13 billion Dollars [5]. Another survey shows 
that consumers in United States only paid about 7.8 billion Dollars over two years 
to repair or replace computer systems affected by malware [6]. United States 
Government Accountability Office stated that in the year 2005 the American 
economy lost about 67.2 billion Dollars because of cybercrimes [7]. 
Unfortunately, Malware techniques are becoming increasingly sophisticated and 
the number of new malware doubles each year than the year before. According to 
F-Secure antivirus Corporation, there were as much malware produced in 2007 as 
in the previous 20 years altogether [8]. Another disturbing fact is that in the year 
2007 the release rate of malicious code and other unwanted programs may be 
C 
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exceeding that of legitimate software applications [9]. Therefore, security 
researchers and professionals have to find more powerful and effective solutions 
to keep up with the explosive growth of malware. 
One of the oldest types of malware is the computer virus. The term was explicitly 
mentioned in Fred Cohen researches that theoretically formalized the problem of 
self-replicating software that he called computer virus. Fred Cohen’s definition of 
computer virus is that it is "a program that can 'infect' other programs by 
modifying them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself" [10].  
Since the first virus appeared in the wild, not only millions of different viruses 
emerged and attacked computers, but also computer viruses have evolved a lot a 
long past decades. The latest type of computer viruses is the metamorphic virus. 
Metamorphic virus is a type of viruses that changes its appearance constantly on 
each infection, yet maintains the same behavior. Because of this change in 
appearance, common simple detection techniques such as string signature 
scanning are useless against metamorphic viruses [11]. 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Several techniques have been proposed to find a solution for metamorphic virus 
detection. However, many of them were unable to reach commercial products due 
to their unacceptable rate of false-positive errors or their high computational 
complexity. Few other methods are widely used, though existing of some 
limitations and false-positive errors motivate the move to find a more reliable and 
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robust way to detect metamorphic viruses. 
In this thesis, we try to tackle the problem of metamorphic virus detection by 
introducing a novel approach based on Eigenfaces technique that is used in face 
recognition problem and use it to detect metamorphic viruses. 
1.2 Contribution 
 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a method to detect metamorphic code with 
least false-positives errors. In our experiment, we tested five well-known 
metamorphic viruses against the system. With very small number of training 
samples of each virus, we succeeded to detect 250 samples of each virus. That is, a 
100% successful detection rate was achieved. A set of benign files taken from 
Cygwin tools package we tested against the system to measure the false-positive 
error rate. The system was able to identify 244 as clean files, that is, 2.4% false-
positive error rate resulted. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is organized into four chapters: 
 Chapter One – Introduction: Gives a brief overview about the problem, 
motivation and the contribution presented in this thesis. 
 Chapter Two – Background: It discusses the various stages computer 
viruses have been through to reach the metamorphic type. In addition, the 
chapter discusses the different methods used to achieve code 
Chapter One  Introduction 
5 
metamorphism. 
 Chapter Three – Eigenviruses: The chapter introduces eigenviruses 
technique and gives the mathematical background behind it. Also, it 
explains the experiment that is carried out to measure the performance of 
the technique. In the last section of the chapter, after a detailed analysis of 
the experiment results, the section lists the results of a random copy of each 
virus used in the experiment when tested against some commercial 
antivirus products. 
 Chapter Four – Conclusion and Future Work: This chapter summarizes the 
thesis and gives some possible ideas to enhance and extend the proposed 
system. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
 
Computer viruses have evolved a lot in the past years. Whenever a new 
technique is used to countermeasure them, virus writers found a new way to make 
their viruses harder and more complex. This chapter discusses the stages of 
evolution the computer viruses have been through until the appearances of 
metamorphic type of viruses. Also an overview of the metamorphism techniques 
used by this type of viruses is given at the end of the chapter. 
2.1 Virus Evolution 
 
We can basically divide the evolution stages of computer viruses into four 
stages as shown in Figure ‎2.1. Plain viruses were the first generation of computer 
viruses. When a plain virus infects a host file, it simply copies itself as it is, thus 
maintains the same structure along its generations. They were executed exactly as 
they were written each time they run. Soon, virus researchers could distinguish 
each virus with a unique pattern of bytes that resembles its signature. Therefore, 
those viruses can be easily detected by their signature. 
Signature detection is very effective in virus detection, in which antivirus 
software searches for unique constant pattern or sequence of bytes in the virus 
body [11]. For example, the signature of the virus segment in Figure ‎2.2 is: 
BE04000000 8BDD B9 0C000000 81C088000000 8B38 89BC8B18110000 2BC6 49 
Consequently, virus writers had to evolve their code in order to evade detection, 
Chapter Two  Background 
8 
and so self-encrypting viruses emerged. 
 
 
Self-encrypting viruses use decryptor at the beginning of the file to decrypt the 
virus body on execution, and each generation of the file uses a different key that is 
generated when the virus is executed. This makes signature detection impossible 
as the virus body is changing on each infection. However, the problem is not hard 
 
Figure ‎2.1  Virus Evolution 
 
Figure ‎2.2  Example virus segment 
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as it seems since the decryptor itself has to be always unencrypted, and then virus 
researchers can extract the signature from it as long as the decryptor is long and 
unique enough [12]. Figure ‎2.3 shows the structure of a typical self-encrypting 
virus.  
Virus writers fought back with oligomorphic type of viruses, in which the virus 
carries some different decryptors with it, and changing the decryptor on each 
infection. The first known oligomorphic virus is called Whale and another famous 
one is Memorial which has 96 different decryptors [13]. A virus is said to be 
oligomorphic if it is capable of mutating its decryptor only slightly [11]. This 
makes antivirus researchers unable to extract a constant pattern from the decryptor 
to be the signature. Therefore, antivirus experts had to provide a more effective 
detection method, and that was the emulator. By using an emulator, the antivirus 
scanner can emulate code execution and after full decryption of the body, a 
 
Figure ‎2.3  Self-encrypting Virus 
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signature can be then extracted [11]. 
A step further taken by attackers is the creation of polymorphic viruses. As 
biological viruses can be mutated in new infections, virus writers took the idea and 
made their virus decryptor mutate in every new infection. They attached a special 
module called mutation engine which responsible for mutating the decryptor to 
another form, yet it maintains the same behavior. Thus, polymorphic viruses can 
mutate their decryptors to billions of different forms, which make them virtually 
impossible to be detected using string signature [12]. 
Emulator was then the antivirus revolution. The antivirus emulator is a module 
that can ―emulate‖ the execution of instructions to make the virus feel that it is on 
a real machine. The emulator can detect loops of decryption and after full 
decryption of the virus body; a signature can then be extracted and compared. 
Figure ‎2.4 shows the process of extracting signature of a polymorphic virus by the 
emulator. 
 
 
Figure ‎2.4  Extracting Signature from a Polymorphic Virus 
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An intuitively predictable step was taken after that, instead of mutating the 
decryptor only, virus writers mutated the entire virus body and thus encryption 
will not be needed any more to evade signature detection, and that was the 
beginning of metamorphic viruses era [14].  
Metamorphic virus has a continuously changing shape for all its body, so that no 
constant sequence can be found in its body. Because a metamorphic virus does not 
need encryption to change its body, decryptor detection does not apply in this 
case. 
In the following section we will discuss the various metamorphism techniques 
used by metamorphic viruses. 
2.2 Metamorphism Techniques 
 
   Metamorphic viruses use many techniques to mutate and obfuscate their code 
while maintaining the same function in each generation. We will explain some of 
these techniques in the following subsections. 
2.2.1  Instruction Reordering 
  
  Code obfuscation techniques used by metamorphic viruses include instruction 
reordering in which the virus divide its code in blocks of certain size, and then the 
mutation engine reorder these blocks by inserting jump instructions between the 
blocks while maintaining the same program result. This technique is also called 
code transportation and permutation [15]. Figure ‎2.5 shows three instruction 
reordering metamorphism among three generations [16]. 
Chapter Two  Background 
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2.2.2  Garbage Code Insertion 
 
   Another technique is garbage code insertion, trash insertion or dead code 
insertion. In this method, the mutation engine inserts useless instructions in 
random locations in the code, which makes the code looks very different in each 
generation. Examples of trash instructions are NOP which does absolutely nothing 
―No Operation‖, ―mov R1, R1‖, ―push R1‖ followed by ―pop R1‖, ―shl R1, 0‖, 
and many other combinations. Thus, by inserting these trash instructions in 
random locations in the virus, the virus has no constant body that can be detected 
using signature scanning [16]. 
2.2.3  Registers Swapping 
 
   Register swapping technique as it sounds is concerned with changing the 
registers operands of an instruction but not changing the instruction itself. An 
 
Figure ‎2.5  Instruction Reordering 
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example of this type of viruses is W95/RegSwap virus. Although the resulting 
morphed virus looks different from the previous version, the variability is not very 
high and the virus can still be detected by using Half-Byte wildcard in signature 
string scanning [17]. Registers swapping technique is also called registers 
renaming or registers exchange. 
2.2.4  Instruction Substitution 
 
   In this technique, the virus is able to replace some of its instructions with 
equivalent ones, while keeping the semantic of the instructions the same. This 
technique was used in MetaPHOR mutation engine that appeared in 2002 and in 
W95/Zmist virus [18]. 
2.2.5  Instructions Transposition 
 
Transposition of instructions is the permutation of some instructions and 
changing their execution order. However, instructions transposition cannot be 
done with any group of instructions. They have to be unrelated, in other words, 
they are not dependent on each other. 
For example, the instructions ―mov eax, edx‖ and ―add ecx, 5‖ have no 
dependency and thus can be transposed safely [19]. W95/Zmist virus that appeared 
in 2001 used this technique in its metamorphic engine. 
Table ‎2.1 shows the detection difficulty of the discussed metamorphism 
techniques. 
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Due to these morphing techniques used by metamorphic viruses, detection of 
such viruses is extremely hard and different from usual detection techniques. 
Because once the virus analyst finds an appropriate unique pattern of bytes in the 
virus body, the virus changes itself to be very different from the previous 
generations. Therefore, other techniques must be sought in order to detect such 
viruses. 
In the next chapter we will show some techniques used to detect metamorphic 
viruses, subsequently we will explain the proposed approach used in this thesis for 
virus detection, then we will depict how we tested our approach and show its 
results, after that we will conduct an analysis of the result and evaluation of the 
technique. 
2.3 Summary 
 
Computer viruses have been through four main stages since their first 
appearance. The first stage was the plain virus, in which the virus keeps the same 
Table ‎2.1 Detection difficulty of some metamorphism techniques 
Technique Easy Medium Hard 
Instructions Reordering    
Garbage Code Insertion    
Registers Swapping    
Instruction Substitution    
Instructions Transposition    
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shape across its generations. Self-encrypting virus is the second stage. Self-
encrypting virus consists of a decryptor and an encrypted body. The body is 
encrypted with a different key on each infection, thus the virus body is always 
changing. However, a signature can be extracted if the decryptor is long enough. 
The third stage is the polymorphic virus. Polymorphic virus changes its decryptor 
and encryption key on each infection, therefore, keeps variable decryptor and body 
along its generations. The latest stage is the metamorphic virus, which is simply 
body polymorphic. That is, there is no decryptor in the virus; however, the virus 
applies metamorphism techniques that are applied on the decryptor in polymorphic 
viruses to be on all the body of the virus. 
There are many metamorphism techniques used to obfuscate the virus body. 
Example of these techniques is instruction reordering, with which the virus 
reorders its instructions to change its shape and inserts some jump instructions to 
maintain the same sequence of execution. Garbage code insertion is another 
method with which the virus inserts unnecessary instructions that does not affect 
the behavior of the virus. Register swapping technique is used to swap some of the 
used registers in the virus body, thus changes the opcode of the instructions. 
Instruction substitution technique concerns with substituting some instructions 
with equivalent ones. Instruction transposition is about changes the order of 
execution of some independent instructions. 
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3 LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
Although many techniques have been proposed for metamorphic virus detection, 
few of them reached commercial products due to their computational feasibility 
and acceptable range of false-positives. In this chapter, we will survey some of 
commercially used techniques and some other experimentally proposed ones. 
3.1 Commercially used Techniques 
 
Detection techniques that succeeded to reach commercial products passed a long 
way of heavy testing since it was first proposed. Not only the success of the 
technique to recognize the virus was the only factor that made it usable, but also 
its time and space efficiency and its low false-positive error rate that it produces. 
The following subsections discuss some of currently used techniques for 
metamorphic virus detection and discuss their weak points as well. 
3.1.1 Geometric Detection 
 
One of commonly used techniques in commercial antivirus applications is 
Geometric Detection [11]. Geometric detection technique detects the changes in 
the infected file structure. For example, when W95/Zmist virus infects a file, it 
increases its virtual size of the data section to be at least 32KB larger than the 
physical size, so that such files can be suspicious of being infected by W95/Zmist. 
Another example is Bistro.B virus, which marks its infected file with value 0x51 
in the high byte of the minor linker version field. However, geometric detection is 
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considered prone to false-positive errors as some safe run-time compressed files 
have the same symptoms [13]. 
3.1.2 Wildcard Scanning 
 
Another method used commercially is Wildcard scanning, which typically used 
for viruses that use register swapping technique mentioned in section 1.3. 
Figure ‎3.1 shows two generations of W95/Regswap [17]. The bold bytes of 
opcode are constants between both generations, so that wildcard scanning can be 
used. The following signature can be used to detect the example in Figure ‎3.1 [17]: 
 
??04000000 8B?? ?? 0C000000 81C088000000 8B?? 89???????????? 2B?? 
Where ―?‖ denotes variable half-byte. 
Some of non-common opcodes between both generations have half-byte 
similarity, so that half byte wildcard can be combined with byte wildcard to 
produce more accurate detection string as the following: 
B?04000000 8B?? ?? 0C000000 81C088000000 8B?? 89???????????? 2BC? 
3.1.3 Stack Decryption Detection 
 
The techniques began when variants of Zmorph virus appeared in the wild. 
Zmorph virus has a polymorphic decryptor at the entry point of the infected file. 
Once the file is executed, the polymorphic code decrypts the virus body and store 
the result into the stack. Moreover, after full decryption of the virus body, it 
transfers the control to the stack for the body to be executed. This technique was 
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new at that time, and emulators were having no attention to the contents of the 
stack for identification. So in order to defeat this type of metamorphism emulators 
had to evolve and be able to detect stack contents. Unfortunately, examining the 
contents of the stack while emulation has negative effect on performance and 
scanning speed [17]. 
 
3.1.4 Subroutine Depermutation 
 
When Zperm and Ghost viruses released, they introduced another form of 
metamorphism. Instead of having the virus code to be executed sequentially 
instruction after instruction, they divided the code into sections or frames or what 
the authors called ―islands‖ of code. Then the virus binds each frame with branch 
instruction to keep the control flow of execution the same. On each infection the 
 
 
Figure ‎3.1  Two Regswap infection code fragments 
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viruses change its shape by permutating the sections or subroutines in another 
order [17]. Some viruses of this type increase their metamorphism by inserting 
garbage blocks of code. This type of metamorphism offers big number of different 
shapes for the mutated virus. Suppose if the number of sections in the virus is n, 
then the different shapes of the virus will be n!. For example, if the file has 10 
sections or subroutines, it would have 3,628,800 different shapes. Figure ‎3.2 
demonstrates subroutine permutation [17].  
   To overcome this technique, a partial emulation can be undertaken to restore the 
original order of the subroutines. This rebuilding process is called depermutation. 
Figure ‎3.3 shows an example of a depermutation process for a sample of permuted 
code.  
 
Figure ‎3.2  Subroutine permutation 
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3.1.5 Regular Expression and DFA 
  
This method was discussed in details in [17], thus, this section is based mainly on 
[17] including figures, unless stated otherwise. In general, this method is 
comparatively fast compared to other techniques used for metamorphic virus 
detection. The method considers the input virus file as a string of alphabets or 
disassembly codes. These codes are compared to a database of various 
disassembly codes of known viruses. If a match is found, then it means that the 
input file is a virus, otherwise, the scanning is terminated and the file is marked as 
 
Figure ‎3.3  Depermutaion process for a permuted 
virus. 
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clean. 
   The matching of the pattern is done through the use of regular expression and 
DFA (Deterministic Finite Automata). In order to proceed in the section, the 
following terminologies have to be clear: 
  Regular expression is a combined string of normal and special characters; 
this string is used to match a pattern within a target text string [20].  
 DFA is a transition table containing states and their corresponding next 
states. 
 Automaton is a predetermined sequence of operations. In this context, it 
corresponds to the sequence of disassembly codes. 
 Grammar – the rules for a language. In this context, the grammar pattern 
relates to the set of disassembly codes that the virus uses and establishes the 
rule or the positive filter for detection. 
The grammar pattern has information used to detect the virus, i.e. accepted 
instructions, and information on normalization, which is about instructions to skip 
or ignore (garbage instructions or negative filters). Grammar pattern uses RegEx 
to represent an assembly instruction. 
A single disassembly code –or in other words, opcode—is an Intel IA-32 
assembly instruction and an operand can be any of the following: 
• Exact – specifies the exact operand to match. 
For example: 
PUSH EAX 
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• Wildcard – specifies the general type of the operand. 
In case of wildcard instructions, the operand and the opcode differ. Possible 
wildcard values that denote registers are REG, REG8, REG16 and REG32, while 
the possible values for the immediate operand are IMM, IMM16 and IMM32. For 
memory operands, MEM, MEM16 and MEM32 are the possible values.  
For example: 
PUSH reg32 
MOV reg, imm 
reg32 denotes that the corresponding instruction –which is PUSH in case of 
the first line– must be present with any 32-bit register. On the other hand, the next 
instruction requires that the MOV opcode is present with any register as the first 
operand and any immediate value as the second operand. 
• Variables – are used to store some information on an operand and retrieved 
later for matching. 
For example: 
DEC reg32_varset1 
PUSH reg_var1 
For the first line, note that DEC opcode must be present with any 32-bit register, 
while varset1 means to store that register type in variable 1. For the next line, 
the PUSH opcode must match and the operand register must also match the 
retrieved value of register variable 1. 
The solution mainly consists of two components: the builder and the simulator. 
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The builder produces the automaton of the virus using the grammar pattern. 
Figure ‎3.4 shows that the pattern source is processed by DFA builder to produce 
automatons. In this processing, each assembly instruction is given a unique ID for 
later referencing and classified as garbage, accept or grammar list. Due to the fact 
that the pattern consists of operators, DFA builder has to deal with precedence. 
Therefore, for easy processing, infix expression is converted into postfix one 
before creating DFA patterns. 
 
On the other hand, the simulator performs the automaton matching and 
conditional test using regular expression operators during file scanning, or briefly 
speaking, it is responsible for scanning files for malicious content. The simulator 
has four sub-components: a disassembler, depermutator, normalizer and DFA 
simulator. Before the data is passed to DFA simulator, it has to be pre-processed 
by the first three sub-components. Figure ‎3.5 shows the simulator components. 
The disassembler part converts the source from binary code to assembly code, 
while the depermutator attaches the subroutines of the permutated virus. The 
 
Figure ‎3.4 The DFA Building Process 
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normalizer component explicitly ignores garbage instructions using the data 
(Garbage section) from the pattern. DFA simulation comes in the final step of the 
process. Using the input symbol resulting from the file being scanned and the 
automaton created in the building process, the DFA simulator scans the file for 
malicious content. 
 
 
The discussed solution detects almost all of the code obfuscation techniques. A 
virus signature for self-encrypting viruses can be creating based on the decryptor’s 
disassembly code. Oligomorphic and polymorphic viruses can be detected by 
creating an automaton based on the virus’ alphabets or the possible set of 
instructions that it can produce during infection. 
Even though polymorphic viruses can produce an almost infinite number of 
different decryptors for each infection, these decryptors can still be split up into 
 
Figure ‎3.5 The DFA Simulation Process 
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manageable parts, which enable the creation of a set of automatons. On most 
cases, these viruses can be detected generically through detection of the 
polymorphic engine. 
Fortunately, this method also handles the detection of permutating viruses 
through the depermutator component, which reorders the subroutines of the 
permutated virus. Compared to emulators, which are known to be slow and cannot 
handle viruses that generate do-nothing loops, this technique basically treats the 
virus as a series of disassembly codes that can be matched with a database of 
existing virus disassembly codes. For more complicated viruses, like Zmist and 
Etap, this detection method works best if joined with a smart emulator. 
3.1.6 Code Transformation Detection 
 
This section is based mainly on [17] including figures, unless stated otherwise. 
Code transformation is a method of translating morphed instructions into a 
simplest form where common codes can be then extracted in order for the virus to 
be captured.  
This technique was first applicable on Etap (aka Simile) virus. Etap reaches high 
level of metamorphism through heavy code transformation. Etap virus uses a 
combination of metamorphic methods such as entry point obfuscation, 
permutation, and heavy code mutation through shrinking and expanding 
techniques which is sometimes called ―accordion model‖. To depict how highly 
metamorphic the virus could be, Figure ‎3.6 and Figure ‎3.7 show two generations 
Chapter Three  Literature Survey 
27 
of Etap that share the same behavior. At the first moment, the two code fragments 
seem very different. Nevertheless, detailed analysis of the code shows that they 
both construct the string ―kernel32.dll‖ in the stack and then call 
―GetModuleHandle‖ API. 
 
 
Figure ‎3.7 Second generation of Etap 
 
Figure ‎3.6 First generation of Etap 
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To achieve this kind of high mutation, the virus code undergoes through several 
steps as in Figure ‎3.8 [21]: 
 
As explained in Figure ‎3.8, Etap has five main components to accomplish its 
metamorphism. It uses the embedded disassembler to decode each of its 
instructions and collect information about instruction length and used registers. 
The shrinker is responsible of compressing the decoded instructions by 
substituting one, two or three instructions with an equivalent single instruction; in 
addition, removing garbage codes and do-nothing loops is done at this stage. 
Figure ‎3.9, Figure ‎3.10 and Figure ‎3.11 shows sample Win32 instructions that 
Etap has compressed/transformed. The next step is using the permutator, in which 
the virus reorders its code blocks to increase the level of metamorphism. The 
expander simply reverses what the shrinker did. It transforms the single 
instructions into corresponding singles, pairs or triplet instructions. In the final 
step, the assembler’s task is to convert the pseudo-assembly code into the real Intel 
IA-32 assembly instructions. 
 
 
 Figure ‎3.8 Etap virus mutation process 
 
Disassembler    Shrinker     Permutator      Expander    Assembler     
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Figure ‎3.9 One-to-one instruction transformation. 
 
Figure ‎3.10 Two-to-one instruction transformation 
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Etap virus detection has three possible solutions – simple string search, behavior 
checking, and code transformation. The first and second methods do not give 
perfect detection and produce some false positive errors. The third method is the 
most suitable solution for this type of metamorphism, but is also very hard to 
implement. 
Most anti-virus engines already support string search, and it was already 
 
Figure ‎3.11 Three-to-one/two/three instruction 
transformation 
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discussed in details earlier, so it will not be discussed here. The second method 
requires an emulator to trace the virus code and activate several flags when a 
behavior that relates to the virus is encountered. 
However, because of the fact that API names cannot be resolved properly in 
some virus samples, this technique does not guarantee perfect detection. In 
addition, an emulator is required to intercept real-time instructions such as RDTSC 
instruction and ensures that correct values are specified so that the virus continues 
its execution. Otherwise, the virus simply terminates and the scanner fails to 
observe the virus behavior, resulting in a missed detection. Another disadvantage 
of this method is that it is slow – because it requires the emulation of every Intel 
IA-32 instruction. 
On the other hand, code transformation is hard to implement. The method 
involves transforming the virus code back to its form prior to the expander stage. 
The resulting form is similar to the first generation as mentioned in Figure ‎3.6. 
In this method, the virus code is transformed into its simplest form, as the 
shrinker component would do, where common instructions for virus detection are 
applicable. Three instructions are transformed to two or one instruction(s); two 
instructions are transformed to one instruction. 
The code transformation module has to be heavily optimized and flexible to be 
able to give possible perfect detection without affecting scanning performance. 
Checking filters via geometric techniques like file structure analysis is also 
desirable. Code transformation is also useful against Zmist virus that uses 
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techniques that are similar to those used by Etap. 
Table ‎3.1 shows the discussed commercially used techniques and their 
limitations. 
3.2 Experimental Techniques 
 
The following subsections demonstrate some proposed techniques for 
metamorphic virus detection. These techniques have been proposed in academic 
publications. However, none of them was widely used in anti-virus commercial 
engines by the time of writing this thesis. The techniques did not reach 
commercial products for one or more reasons, either their low successful detection 
rate or time and space infeasibility or high false-positive rate. The subsections 
discuss some of these techniques and their disadvantages. 
3.2.1 Arbitrary Length of Control Flow Graphs 
 
In 2006 a static analysis heuristic detection method by arbitrary length of 
Table ‎3.1 Limitations of some detection techniques 
Technique Limitation 
Generic Detection High false-positive rate 
Wildcard Scanning 
Limited to single metamorphism 
technique 
Stack Decryption  Limited, slow 
Subroutine Depermutation Limited 
RegEx and DFA 
Needs emulator with complex 
viruses 
Code Transformation 
Limited to shrink up to only three 
instructions 
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control flow graphs was presented by [22], assuming the virus does not change its 
control flow during propagation, but if it does, the authors proposed applying 
nodes alignment for detection [22]. The method showed 100% successful 
detection of the subject test files. However, the method was applied to only two 
virus classes, NGVCK and VCL32, and the number of test sample of each was 60 
files, which is not enough number to show the efficiency of the method. In 
addition the method was not applied on other hard metamorphic viruses, such as 
W95/Zperm or W32/Simile. The paper also did not mention anything about how 
the method performs when testing benign files. As a result, percentage of false-
positive errors of the method was not defined.  
3.2.2 Zeroing Transformation 
 
Another method is zeroing transformation method that is used to reverse the 
effect of some obfuscation techniques done by the mutation engine. The resulting 
form of the program after applying zeroing transformation on it is called zero 
form. Their method showed considerable decrease in the number of variants of 
subject programs considered in their test [23]. However, The Zeroing 
Transformation method does not work against expression rewriting at a low level. 
For example, the statements in Figure ‎3.12(a) are equivalent to Figure ‎3.12(b). 
However, zeroing transformation cannot recognize that [24]. 
3.2.3 Hidden Markov Model 
 
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is another method for metamorphic virus 
Chapter Three  Literature Survey 
34 
detection proposed by Wing Wong and Mark Stamp [25]. Hidden Markov Model 
is a statistical model was first presented by Leonard E. Baum and then it was used 
in pattern and speech recognition [26], after that it began to be used in biological 
sequences and DNA analysis [27]. HMM was used by Wing Wong and Mark 
Stamp to detect metamorphic viruses [25]. The authors were able to distinguish 
between NGVCK virus samples and normal files with some false-positive errors. 
They showed good results in detecting some metamorphic viruses that have 
relatively high similarity among generations. However, the authors did not show 
the results if a well-known hard metamorphic virus is tested such as W95/Zmist, 
W95/Zperm or W95/Bistro. Besides, it suffers from unacceptable rate of false 
positive when testing normal non-virus files against the system [28]. 
3.2.4 Static Analyzer of Vicious Executables (SAVE) 
 
Authors of [29] proposed a static analysis tool called SAVE which stands for 
―Static Analyzer of Vicious Executables‖. The tool uses a technique of identifying 
 
 
Figure ‎3.12  Two equivalent code fragments 
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the malicious files with a sequence of API calls and not sequence of instruction as 
in string scanning. The method first decompresses the binary file (if it was 
packed), then it parses the binary file to extract the API sequence used by the file. 
After extracting the sequence it is compared to a database of other malicious files 
sequences using a similarity measure.  The method also uses optimal sequence 
alignment algorithm to align the API sequence to the compared sequence of the 
virus database and tests the similarity between them. If the similarity was above 
certain threshold, then the test file is identified as a known malicious program. 
Else the file is tagged as cleared. Figure ‎3.13 shows the operation of SAVE tool 
[29]. The tool uses three distance measures to identify the sample, the cosine 
measure, the extended Jaccard measure and the Pearson’s correlation measure. 
 
 
Figure ‎3.13 Static Analyzer for Vicious Executable 
(SAVE) 
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The authors showed that when the samples stated in the paper are modified 
manually, the commercial antivirus scanners fail to detect them, while SAVE tool 
succeeded to recognize all the samples. However, the different variants shown in 
the paper were generated by manual obfuscation and were not by the sample 
polymorphic engine. Also the samples were not of well-known hard metamorphic 
viruses; rather most of them were worms. In addition, the technique is mostly 
prone to false-positive errors, as API calling sequence can have high similarity 
between different viruses as they have similar behavior.  
Metamorphic virus detection is still an open problem in computer virology 
science. There is no high performance and guaranteed method for detecting a wide 
range of this type of viruses [28] [30], yet some commercial techniques are doing 
a good job until now.  
Table ‎3.2 shows the discussed experimental methods and their limitations. 
Table ‎3.2 Limitations of some experimental techniques 
Technique Limitation 
Arbitrary Length of Control 
Flow Graphs 
Easy to bypass by obfuscating 
control flow instructions. 
Zeroing Transformation 
Bypassed by low level expression 
rewriting. 
Hidden Markov Model Unacceptable rate of false-positive 
Static Analyzer of Vicious 
Executables (SAVE) 
Easy to bypass by obfuscating API 
names. 
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3.3 Summary 
 
Current techniques for metamorphic virus detection can be categorized into two 
categories. The first one is the practical or commercial techniques, while the 
second category is the experimental techniques. In this chapter, six commercial 
techniques have been discussed. The first technique is geometric detection, which 
concerns with the changes of the infected file in its structure and map these 
changes to known viruses that cause such changes. However, the method is prone 
to false-positive and not effective against many metamorphic viruses. Another 
method is wildcard scanning, which is very effective against viruses that use only 
register swapping technique to obfuscate their code. Stack decryption detection is 
another method for detection which is used only against viruses that decrypt its 
code in the stack.  However, examining the contents of the stack adversely affects 
the scanning performance. Subroutine depermutation is used to reorder virus’s 
code blocks. This method is very effective against permutated viruses such as 
W95/Zperm. Using regular expression with DFA is another effective method 
against viruses such as MetaPHOR. However, it is hard to implement and 
considered slow when used to detect complex viruses as it needs to be coupled 
with smart emulator. The last discussed method is code transformation. In this 
method, the virus is translated to a basic form by removing garbage code, 
depermutating the virus body and substituting some instructions with fewer 
equivalent ones. 
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There many experimental techniques proposed to countermeasure metamorphic 
viruses. Nevertheless, many of them did not reach commercial products due to 
their complexity or unacceptable range of false-positive errors. Arbitrary length of 
control flow graphs is a proposed method to detect viruses that does not change its 
execution flow during execution, but if it does, the method’s authors proposed 
applying nodes alignment for detection. However, the authors did not apply the 
method on well-known hard metamorphic viruses; they also did not measure the 
false-positive rate of their method.  Another proposed method is zeroing 
transformation, which tries to reverse some code obfuscation techniques and 
transforms the code into a basic shorter form. However, the method cannot 
transform some complex expression rewriting. Hidden Markov model is a 
statistical analysis method used to identify common patterns among copies of the 
metamorphic virus. Nonetheless, the method suffers unacceptable rate of false-
positive errors. Static analysis of vicious executables is another proposed method 
for virus detection. The method concerns with extracting the API calling sequence 
of the virus and comparing it with known sequences in the database. In the 
experiment of the method, variants were generated manually and not automatically 
by their polymorphic engine. Also the method is easy to bypass by obfuscating the 
API names inside the virus. 
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4 EIGENVIRUSES 
 
In this thesis, we present a detection approach based on a well-known face 
recognition technique called Eigenfaces [31]. Eigenfaces approach is widely and 
effectively used for face recognition problem. Eigenfaces approach states that 
every face is a linear combination of other basic set of faces called ―Eigenfaces‖. 
The same person could have two different images due to change in age or light 
conditions or pose of face; in this case, the Eigenfaces differ in some basic faces, 
but not all of them. The method measures how much similarity and difference 
among the subject faces to decide if they can be mapped to a known face in the 
database or not. Figure ‎4.1 shows an original face and its basic Eigenfaces that 
construct it with some different weights [32]. 
 
 
Figure ‎4.1  Face consists of some eigenfaces. 
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Our approach is using Eigenfaces technique with some modifications. As 
different images of the same person have some similarity among themselves, 
different copies of a metamorphic virus have also common similarity. Figure ‎4.2 
generated by our system shows W95/Zperm viruses as an image (at the top), and 
number of its eigenviruses binaries at the bottom. 
 
PCA (Principal Components Analysis) which is a statistical tool used in 
Eigenfaces method is used to quantify these similarities. PCA identifies the largest 
variances across multi-dimensional data and retains most of them. The new 
orthogonal vectors that span across these variations are called eigenvectors [33]. 
 
 
Figure ‎4.2  W95/Zperm virus consists of number of eigenviruses. 
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Figure ‎4.3 shows the eigenvectors that quantify the largest variance of a two 
dimensional data.  
 
Eigenfaces approach takes advantage of principal component analysis that is 
used extensively in information theory. Eigenfaces approach treats the problem of 
face recognition as 2-D recognition problem as faces are normally upright, and 
ignores the geometric details of the face, which makes it relatively 
computationally easy and simple. The approach functions by first acquiring a set 
of face images, then determines the vectors or axes that span across the significant 
variations among the face images, those vectors are called eigenvectors, and the 
space defined by these vectors is called eigenspace. Since those eigenvectors when 
drawn give face-like images, they are called Eigenfaces. 
The set of images are then projected –or in other words represented in terms of 
eigenvectors-- into the eigenspace or feature space, and then the system 
 
Figure ‎4.3 Eigenvectors of a set of 2D data 
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characterizes each face by weighted sum of the Eigenfaces features. Therefore, in 
order to determine if a new face belongs to one of the initial set or not, the new 
input image is projected into the eigenspace of the set of image and a distance 
classifier is computed between the new image’s weight and each weight in the 
initial set. If the distance is below some threshold that was determined previously, 
then the image belongs to its closest class of face image, otherwise, the image does 
not belong to that class. 
In the following parts of the thesis we will refer to ―Eigenviruses‖ as the basic 
set of binaries that construct the virus which corresponds to Eigenfaces that when 
linearly combined constructs the face. ―Training set‖ is the database of viruses by 
which our system is trained to recognize. Whereas ―Test set‖ is the set of input 
viruses’ replicates to be recognized. The term ―replicate‖ refers to a morphed copy 
of a virus, and the term ―virus‖ –in this context– is a general term that identifies 
the type of one or more replicate files such as W32/Etap, and the term ―virus 
class‖ is the set of replicates that belong to a the virus. It is the mission of the 
technique to map an input replicate to its virus class, as Eigenfaces approach maps 
the input image to its face class. 
The system functions by first acquiring a set of replicate files from different 
viruses, with more than one file from each virus. This set will be the training set of 
our model, then we determine the vectors or axes that span across the significant 
variations among the replicate files, those vectors are called eigenvectors and they 
construct a space called eigenspace. Since those eigenvectors when linearly 
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combined together with certain weights they give one of the original virus 
replicates according to the weight, then they can be called ―Eigenviruses‖. The set 
of the original replicates are then projected into that eigenspace or feature space 
constructed by the eigenviruses by finding the weights of each replicate. Thus, the 
system characterizes each virus replicate by weighted sum of eigenviruses. Then 
in order to determine if a new virus belongs to one of the initial set or not, the new 
input virus replicate is projected into the eigenspace of the set of the initial virus 
replicates and a distance classifier is computed between the new replicate’s weight 
vector and each weight vector in the initial set. If the distance between the input 
file and the closest replicate vector in initial set is below some threshold that was 
determined previously, then they belongs to the same virus, otherwise the replicate 
does not belong to that virus. 
Figure ‎4.4 shows the steps required to test an input file against the system. 
4.1 Preparations 
 
In order to apply the Eigenfaces approach on binary files, some preparations and 
modifications had to be made to the approach. First, it is important to remove any 
data in the file that is not directly relevant to the virus body. In order to do this, we 
removed the PE header of the file to be examined as it is not important in virus 
recognition in our approach, and then we extracted the malicious code of the 
executable file to be tested and save it into a file. By using infection flags, certain 
sections of PE files could only be subject to test, which reduces the complexity of 
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the test. We also emphasize that the proposed approach focuses on recognition and 
classification of a malicious pattern and it is not responsible of locating and 
extracting the malicious pattern from a file. 
 
Because the approach requires that all inputs have to be in the same length, the 
input code is padded with zeros to a certain length specified when building the 
training set. This length is called ―Eigenvirus length‖. The Eigenvirus length is 
 
 
Figure ‎4.4 Steps to test a new input file against the system. 
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decided based on the largest virus in the training set. Based on this length, every 
other input file or other virus replicate in training set that has shorter length must 
be padded to the eigenvirus length. If an input file is larger than the eigenvirus 
length, then the virus is chopped from the end to be equal to that length. 
Unlike the original approach of Eigenfaces, we did not remove mean vector of 
the samples. Removing the mean face of face samples in Eigenfaces approach 
seems intuitive as all faces of different people have obvious common features, so 
that removing common features makes the remaining features more descriptive for 
the face. However, when working with binary virus files, this is not the case. 
Because not only different viruses can look very different, but also they can look 
similar to normal applications, so that subtracting the mean vector was not applied 
here. In addition, the original Eigenfaces approach considered one space threshold 
for the entire eigenspace, while we compute M space thresholds for the M virus 
classes in the training set. This will be further explained in the next section as well 
as in section 4.4. 
4.2 Model Description 
 
In this section, we will describe the algorithm used to project the set of virus 
replicates into the eigenspace, as well as how a new input replicate can be 
recognized as belongs to a virus class in initial set. 
 To construct the training set, the following steps is done: 
1- Acquire an initial set of virus replicate files. M training replicate files. 
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2- Determine the largest file size; let us say of size N bytes. Then pad the other 
files with zeros to be all of size N. 
3- Represent each virus replicate as a column vector Φ. Therefore, Φ is an N x 
1 vector. 
4- Incorporate all individual virus replicate vectors into one N x M matrix A.  
A = [    Φ1, Φ2… ΦM]. 
5- Find the eigenvectors u of the covariance matrix C, where C = AAT. 
However, since C would be N × N which is computationally infeasible to get 
its eigenvectors for large viruses, and also C is not needed in any further 
computations, we should obtain eigenvectors of C without computing the 
value of C itself. 
Suppose a matrix L = A
T
A, where L is M x M matrix and vi is an eigenvector 
of L. So  
 
A
T
A vi = λi vi 
 
Where λi is the eigenvalue, by multiplying both sides by A it yields, 
A A
T 
Avi = λi Avi 
 
However, C = A A
T
, so Avi is an eigenvector of C. As a result, if v is the set 
of M eigenvectors of L, then Av is the set of eigenvectors of C. 
Hence u = Av, then we can use v to calculate the M largest eigenvectors of C 
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where M << N as M is the number of training virus replicates.  
6- Sort the eigenvectors according to their associated eigenvalues. The higher 
the eigenvalue, the more important is the eigenvector in describing the 
features. 
7- We can then choose a number of eigenvectors M` with high eigenvalues to 
describe the eigenspace, since not all eigenvectors represent important 
features of the space. 
8- When projecting each virus replicate    into the eigenspace, each replicate 
can be represented as a linear combination of eigenvectors and weights. 
 
  Φi = Σ
M`
j=1  ωj µj,  where M` <= M 
 
The weights for each replicate i can be calculated as: 
 
ωj = µ
T
j Φi  , j = 1, 2 …, M` 
 
The weights of the replicate can be combined into a vector Ω, where: 
 Ωi
T
 = [ω1, ω2 … ωM`]. 
 
The previous steps were necessary to initialize the system, after that, the 
following steps are used to recognize a new input file: 
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1- Project the input file Φ  into the eigenspace and determine its weights. 
 
ωj = µ
T
j  Φ     , j = 1, 2 … M` 
 
ΩT = [ω1, ω2 … ωM`]. 
 
2- Determine how much the input file is close to a certain virus class by 
measuring the Euclidean distance from its weights vector to the nearest virus 
replicate weight vector in the training set. This distance is called ―virus class 
distance‖ ε. 
 
εk
2
 = || Ω - Ωk ||
2 
 
ε should be less than a threshold θ, which is determined heuristically. 
3- If we consider all the M eigenvectors to construct the eigenspace, then when 
a virus replicate is projected in the eigenspace, it can then be reconstructed 
back perfectly, as we did not ignore any of its features. However, since we 
chose M` eigenvectors where M` < M, accurate reconstruction of the virus 
replicate will not be achieved. So there will be a difference between original 
input replicate vector Φ and   ∑     
  
    , where Φv is the restoration of 
the eigenspace projected file vector. 
This difference is called ―virus space distance‖, and can be measured as: 
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    α2 = || Φ - Φv ||
2
 
Space distance measures how much the projected file lost from its features. 
In other words, it measures how much the eigenviruses represent the virus 
features. The lower the number, the fewer the loss, the more features are 
represented by the chosen eigenviruses. Since the chosen eigenviruses quantify 
the common features of all projected viruses in the space, the space distance 
can vary according to the virus. For each virus i, the space distance α of a 
newly belonging projected file should be below a threshold βi. 
  
There are four possibilities for the input file to be: 
a- Near from a virus class and near from virus space of that class: 
 In this case, the input file is recognized as belongs to that virus class. 
b- Near from a virus class and far from virus space of that class: 
This happens when the input file does not belong to any class in the space, 
but when projected into the eigenspace, it loses many of its original features 
that make it looks like one of the candidate virus class. 
c- Far from a virus class and near from virus space of that class: 
In this case, the input file also does not belong to any virus classes in the 
space. However, it shares some features with existing classes. False-
negatives might occur in this case. 
d- Far from virus class and far from virus space of that class:  
This case takes place when the input file does not belong to any class in the 
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training set and does not share features with them as well. 
4.3 Experiment 
 
In this section, we will describe our simulation that was undertaken to evaluate 
the proposed approach. The next subsection describes the virus classes used in the 
experiment and other preparations 
4.3.1 Samples used 
 
We chose five viruses to run our test. They are as follows: 
1- G2 Construction Kit:  
G2 is a virus construction kit developed by ―Dark Angel‖ the same author of 
―Phalcon/Skism Mass-Produced Code Generator‖ which is an earlier virus 
generator. G2 produces a COM and 16-bit EXE infectors. The kit has a 
configuration file that can be set to have the desired virus features, and then the kit 
produces assembly code according to the configurations. G2 can produce a 
different virus every time it runs, even though the values in configuration file 
remain unchanged. The kit mainly uses equivalent instructions substitution to 
achieve obfuscation. In our test we used version 1.0 which was released in January 
1993 [34]. 
2- Next Generation Virus Creation Kit (NGVCK): 
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NGVCK is a virus creation kit written in Visual Basic that each time it runs it 
creates a virus code. Each virus created from NGVCK kit does the same 
function. However, every virus has almost completely different structure, which 
makes scanning the generated virus with the same scan string almost impossible 
[35][36]. NGVCK uses garbage instruction insertion, code reordering and 
register replacement techniques to obfuscate the generated virus code. NGVCK 
infects 32-bit executables and have multiple encryption methods; it also provides 
anti-debugging code inside the generated viruses. We used NGVCK v0.30 as it is 
a stable version that was released in June 2001. In the process of generating 
NGVCK sample files, we maintained the same configuration for all generated 
files.  
3- Zperm virus: 
Zperm was developed by the notorious virus writer ―Z0mbie‖ in the year 2000. 
Zperm virus was one of the first 32-bit viruses for Windows platforms. The virus 
mainly uses permutation engine to change its instructions order constantly in each 
infection, including changing its permutation engine as well [37].  Zperm does not 
produce constant virus body anywhere as self-encrypting viruses do, instead, it 
permutates itself by adding and removing jump instructions and garbage 
instructions to produce a highly different versions of the virus. Therefore, 
detecting the virus cannot be done using scan string [38]. 
4- MetaPHOR virus: 
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MetaPHOR is a very hard metamorphic virus that was developed by ―Mental 
Driller‖ in 2002. In fact, MetaPHOR was a challenge to antivirus researchers 
when it emerged. It is highly obfuscated and difficult to understand [18]. The 
virus uses various metamorphism techniques to produce a highly different new 
form of the virus on each infection. The virus –most of the time-- consists of a 
decryptor and a body. While the decryptor has a size of 4KB, the virus body has 
a size of more than 100KB. In our test, we used only the decryptor of the virus to 
test against the system as it is not encrypted and much smaller than the body, 
thus we can minimize the training set size. MetaPHOR is also called W32/Simile 
and W32/Etap. 
5- Flibi worm: 
Flibi is a metamorphic worm that changes its code and behavior across 
generations. Flibi uses new techniques for metamorphism than usual 
aforementioned ones. It has some analogies with molecular biology. While DNA 
consists of a string of nucleotides and three of the four nucleotides in the human 
body form a single codon, then multiple codons can be translated by tRNA to 
amino acids. Flibi creates a meta-language of equal size instructions of eight bits. 
The eight bits coding a single instruction in the meta-language are analogs of the 
three codons representing one amino acid and each x86 instruction parallels to 
amino acid. Therefore, as the same amino acid can be constructed by different 
codons, the same meta-language instruction can be constructed by different 
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binary values, which then translated via a translation module written in x86 
assembly into x86 instructions. When producing a new generation, the worm 
flips a random bit in the code, which in turn can change the meta-language to x86 
instructions mapping, thus changing the behavior. There are two version of Flibi 
at the time of writing. Flibi.A that was released in late 2010 and it uses bit flip, 
byte-exchange and NOP-insertion mutations, and Flibi.B, which we used in our 
experiment, was released in mid-2011 and uses the same mutations operation as 
Flibi.A, plus horizontal gene transfer and a polymorphism technique [39][40]. 
4.3.2 Preparations 
 
We generated two data sets for our test, a training set and a test set. The training 
set contains samples virus replicates of each virus; the system uses these samples 
to learn about each virus. Number of samples needed for each virus differs 
according to the virus, the more metamorphism used, the more samples needed. 
For constructing the training set, we needed 1, 6, 8, 15 and 2 samples of G2, 
NGVCK, Zperm, MetaPHOR and Flibi respectively, so our training set has 32 
files. We chose eigenvirus length to be 64KiB, so that all subject files can quietly 
fit in that length. On the other hand, the test set contains replicates of each virus to 
test against the system after learning process completes. Test set contains 250 
different replicates of each virus so the total number in the test set is 1250 
different files. 
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After constructing the training set, we had 32 eigenviruses that describe the 
features of the training set. We chose only three eigenviruses that have the highest 
eigenvalues to construct the eigenspace, yet with only three eigenviruses the 
system showed very good results. The number of eigenviruses needed to construct 
descriptive space that holds the most features of viruses’ classes is done 
heuristically. 
4.3.3 Results 
   
    In our simulation, we constructed the training set and then we tested each file in 
the test set against the system, then we determined the closest file in the training 
set to the input virus. If there were both belong to the same virus, then it means 
correct detection, otherwise, the input file cannot be correctly classified. Table ‎4.1 
shows the samples needed in the training set for each virus and the result of testing 
each virus replicate against the system. 
   Space and class thresholds of each class are determined based on the result of 
testing the known test set. In our test, we chose the maximum values of space and 
Table ‎4.1 Results of test set against the system. 
Virus Samples 
Needed 
Correctly 
Matched 
Percentage 
G2 1 250 100% 
NGVCK 6 250 100% 
Zperm 8 250 100% 
MetaPHOR 15 250 100% 
Flibi 2 250 100% 
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class distance among the correctly matched files, so that these values correspond 
to the boundary of the virus class, by which we can classify an unknown input. A 
point worth to be noted is that, the threshold values are determined heuristically 
i.e. it is not necessary to choose the highest values among the correctly matched 
samples, but also a larger value can be chosen that mostly guarantees that all other 
samples from the class will lie within the class boundary. Table ‎4.2 shows the 
threshold of each of the five virus classes in our training set. 
When constructing the eigenspace, replicates from the same class are distributed 
near each other according to the similarities among them. Standard deviation of a 
group of replicates of the same class will be a good similarity measure for files 
from this class. Table ‎4.3 shows the standard deviation of each class in the training 
set across each dimension. The values in Table ‎4.3 are rounded up to the nearest 
integer.  
As we chose three eigenviruses to construct the eigenspace, we could then plot 
the viruses in a 3D space, and see how they are distributed. Figure ‎4.6 shows the 
sample files in the training set distributed in the 3D eigenspace where each axes in 
Table ‎4.2 Class and space thresholds for each virus. 
Virus Class 
Threshold 
Space 
Threshold 
G2 50 3000 
NGVCK 232 4500 
Zperm 2444 13683 
MetaPHOR 496 5857 
Flibi 4267 13486 
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Table ‎4.3 Standard deviation of each virus class across 3D space. 
Virus X Y Z 
G2 0 0 0 
NGVCK 128 57 236 
Zperm 957 1896 2078 
MetaPHOR 247 84 201 
Flibi 134 12 82 
 
the space is an eigenvirus. Figure ‎4.5 shows the test set samples distributed in the 
eigenspace.  
4.3.4 Testing Benign Files 
 
To measure the false positive errors in our system, in which a benign program is 
classified as malicious, we acquired 250 programs from Cygwin [41] utilities to 
test against the system. We extracted the CODE or .text sections (which represent 
the executable sections in most files in general) from all the files we examined and 
save it into a file, then the file is tested against the system. After we project the 
input file into the eigenspace, we determine its nearest virus class. If the projected 
file has distance more than the space or class threshold to its nearest class, so the 
file is correctly classified as does not belong to the space. Otherwise, the file is 
misclassified as one of virus classes and then a false-positive error produced. In 
our test, ten input Cygwin file was misclassified as virus. After projecting the 
input files into the eigenspace, 244 files had a distance more than the threshold 
specified for each class. This means we had 97.6% correct identifications of the 
sample normal files and 2.4% of false-positive errors for the subject samples. 
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Figure ‎4.6 Training set virus replicates in a 3D eigenspace. 
 
 
Figure ‎4.5 Test set virus replicates in a 3D eigenspace 
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4.4 Analysis and Evaluation 
 
Space distance is an indicator to how much the input virus belongs to the 
eigenspace. The lower the number, the more feature description done by the 
chosen eigenviruses that construct the space. As Table ‎4.2 shows, G2 has the 
lowest class and space thresholds, which means that its samples are not scattered 
across the eigenspace, rather it is somehow confined in a small space and the three 
chosen eigenviruses could describe most of its features. Whereas Zperm has the 
highest space threshold due do its high variability and dissimilarities among its 
replicates. 
Standard deviation is also a very good measure of the similarity among 
replicates of the same virus, as standard deviation measures the dispersion of 
replicates from their mean point. By examining Table ‎4.1 we can notice that G2 
has zero standard deviation as we needed just one sample. On the other hand, 
Zperm has the highest standard deviation among other classes. Zperm uses code 
reordering extensively in a way that is not used by the other three viruses, and that 
is the reason why its replicates have such a high variability. 
Dispersion of Zperm in the eigenspace with such comparatively high standard 
deviation can lead to false-positive errors with some benign files, as a projected 
benign file can lie anywhere in the eigenspace. The less the standard deviation of 
each virus class in the space, the less likely a false-positive error would occur. 
Normalization techniques can greatly help reduce the variability of the subject 
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input file if it is used to preprocess the file before the test [42]. In case of Zperm, 
we believe that the use of a depermutator to preprocess the file would greatly 
reduce its standard deviation. 
There is a tradeoff between database (training set) size and accurate recognition 
results. Since the training set represents the knowledgebase by which the system 
can learn about viruses, so the more training data, the more features extracted from 
them, the more accurate results achieved. However, more space and time 
complexity arise. Number of replicates for each virus needed for accurate 
recognition differs according to the virus. For viruses that have high similarity 
among their replicates, few samples are needed to construct a good model, while 
the opposite for hard metamorphic viruses. The size of the initial database of the 
system can be determined heuristically by increasing the number of replicates in 
each class to reach acceptable results. In addition, the system can have a 
continuous learning process. When the system successfully recognize a new input 
file as belongs to one of the classes in the database, the new file can be 
incorporated into the database so more features can be extracted and learned then 
more accurate results would be given afterwards. 
To give a hint about system performance, the approach was implemented using 
MATLAB 7.0 R14 and ran on Windows XP SP2 and Intel Dual-core 2.60GHZ 
processor with 2GB RAM. It took the system about 21 seconds to scan the 1000 
test files. 
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In order to compare the results of the system with existing detection systems, we 
tested a random replicate from each of the virus classes used in the experiment 
against three well-known antivirus products. Table ‎4.4 shows the result of this test 
[43]-[47]
 1
. 
 
 The antivirus engines are chosen from the top of best antivirus software for the 
year 2009 according to AV Comparative report [48]. The versions used for 
Symantec, Kaspersky and ESET are 20111.1.0.186, 9.0.0.837 and 7.2 
respectively.    
It can be noted from the results in Table ‎4.4 that G2 is easy to detect so that all 
considered products succeeded to recognize. On the other hand, NGVCK evaded 
all the products except Symantec Norton that recognized the sample as a heuristic 
virus, i.e. the software suspects the file, but it does not recognize its name and in 
this case, the antivirus product will be unable to repair the infected file. In case of 
Zperm virus, it was successfully detected by most of the products while Symantec 
Norton recognized it as ―Bloodhound.W32.1‖ which is a heuristic type of viruses 
                                              
1
 DISCLAIMER: The comparison does not reflect the products’ virus detection capabilities or stands as a 
benchmarking report. It only demonstrates how such a viral replicate can be found by the products. 
Table ‎4.4 Testing random virus replicates against commercial AVs 
 G2 NGVCK Zperm MetaPHOR Flibi 
Symantec Norton  Detected Heuristic Heuristic Detected - 
Kaspersky Detected - Detected Detected - 
ESET BitDefender Detected - Detected Detected Heuristic 
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and so that it cannot be repaired [49]. In case of MetaPHOR, the replicate was 
detected by all products, while Flibi was not recognized by any product except 
BitDefender that recognized it as a heuristic malware. 
4.5 Summary 
 
Different images of the same person’s face may seem different due to the 
change in pose or light direction. However, there are still common pattern among 
those images with which the person could be identified, and this is the main idea 
behind Eigenfaces approach. The same can be applied on replicates of the same 
metamorphic virus, thus comes the term Eigenviruses. The proposed system 
functions by first acquiring a set of files to be trained with. The system constructs 
an eigenspace where the common features of the training set represent the axes of 
this space. Then to test if a new file belongs to any of the viruses in the training set 
or not, the input file is projected into the eigenspace and its distance from each 
virus is calculated. If the distance between the input file and the closest virus is 
below certain threshold, the file is considered a morphed copy of the matched 
virus. Otherwise, the file does not belong to any virus in the database. 
The system experiment was run on five well-known metamorphic viruses, G2, 
NGVCK, Zperm, MetaPHOR and Flibi. With 1, 6, 8, 15 and 2 training samples of 
each of them respectively. Then 250 test files of each virus were tested against the 
system. The result is 100% correct recognition of the test files. Also to measure 
false-positive errors, 250 clean files taken from Cygwin tools packages were tested 
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against the system. Only 6 files were marked as belong to the database, this gives 
a false-positive rate of 2.4%. 
The last section of the chapter discusses and analyses the results of the previous 
section. Space distance is an indicator to how much the input virus belongs to the 
eigenspace. The lower the number, the more feature description done by the 
chosen eigenviruses that construct the space. One important result is the standard 
deviation of each virus. The larger the standard deviation, the more metamorphic 
is the virus. Finally, the section shows the results when a random replicate of each 
used virus is tested against some antivirus engines. 
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5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This chapter concludes the work done in this thesis and intensifies the strong 
points and possible limitations of the proposed techniques.  It also sheds some 
lights on possible enhancements of the system to reach better and more efficient 
results. 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
Metamorphic viruses are the hardest to detect, because of their ongoing change in 
structure while keeping the logical sequence the same on each infection. We 
developed a novel approach for metamorphic virus recognition based on a 
statistical machine learning technique. Our proposed approach is based on 
Eigenfaces technique that is generally used to solve face recognition problems. 
When experimented, our approach successfully recognized 100% of the test set 
files which consists of 1250 metamorphic virus replicates of five different hard 
metamorphic viruses, yet, we had 2.4% false-positive errors when 250 benign files 
were tested against the system. 
The proposed approach starts with a small training set that contains some 
replicates of each virus, and then determines the most important features among 
these replicates. The system represents these features by what is called 
Eigenviruses. Eigenviruses are vectors that span across the most important 
features in the sample files. By representing these sample files in terms of 
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Eigenviruses, the recognition task is then a mere pattern recognition problem and 
can be solved using clustering techniques. For the five sample virus classes we 
chose in our test, Euclidean distance was used as a distance measure between 
classes. Although the used distance measure technique is very simple, it showed 
very good results with the chosen test set. One important advantage of the 
technique is that it does not depend on instructions semantic in virus’ code. 
Therefore, common anti-debugging and anti-emulators techniques are not useful 
against the system. 
5.2 Future Work 
 
To identify the potentials of the proposed system, more viruses are needed to be 
tested. Due to restrictions in time and resources, only five well-known 
metamorphic viruses were tested. The first point as a future work is to increase the 
number of viruses and number of replicates of each virus in order to have a clearer 
picture about the capabilities of the proposed system. 
With high number of virus classes used, Euclidean distance measure may not 
give good results. Other effective techniques can be used such as Mahalanobis 
distance as a distance measure or using SVM (Support Vector Machine) to cluster 
the groups of virus classes. 
In addition, to reduce the potential errors that may occur with larger number of 
viruses, some malware normalization techniques can be used, such as using 
depermutator to help reorganize viruses that use code reordering obfuscation 
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techniques. With such preprocessing for the input test file, we believe that the 
system will have great performance when used as a product. Also a detailed 
performance analysis should be made to accurately determine the space and time 
complexity of the proposed system. 
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 هطتخلص
بخلاف الأنواع الأخرى من  .يعتبر الميتامورفيك فيروس هو الأخطر ضمن كل أنواع الفيروسات
فيروسات الكمبيوتر التى يمكن كشفها سواء بالطرق الثابتة مثل طريقة الكشف بالشكل الثابت 
للفيروس أو بالطرق المتغيرة مثل طريقة المحاكاة، يعتمد الميتامورفيك فيروس على تغيير شكله 
ياً للباحثين فى مجال أمن لتجنب مثل هذه الطرق، مما يجعل الميتامورفيك فيروس تحدياً حقيق
المعلومات. فى هذه الرسالة، سيتم دراسة الطرق التى يستخدمها الميتامورفيك فيروس لتغيير نفسه 
وإعادة تسمية و اعادة ترتيب الكود وتبديل أجزاء من الكود مثل إدخال أكواد عديمة الأهمية 
مستخدمه للكشف عن هذا النوع من المسجلات. ثم بعد ذلك سيتم تقديم معاينة للطرق الموجودة وال
الفيروسات التجارية وتلك  سنقدم كلاً من الطرق المستخدمة فى برامج مضادات وفيها الفيروسات
 فى أبحاث علمية. المقدمة
للكشف عن فيروسات الميتامورفيك معتمدًة على طريقة التعليم بغير  جديدة ثم بعد ذلك نقدم طريقة
نقوم ثم ، طرق التعرف على الوجوه احدى ومستوحاة من لصناعىُمعلم المستخدمة فى الذكاء ا
بتحليل أداء الطريقة المقترحة ونبين نتائج تجريبية لتلك الطريقة مقارنًة مع نتائج برامج معروفة من 
مضادات الفيروسات. وأخيراً سنناقش التحسينات المستقبلية و المحتملة للطريقة المقترحة للتعرف 
 أكثر من الفيروسات. على أعداد و أنواع
  
  
 
 الأكاديـمية العـربـيـة للعلـوم و التكنـولـوجيـا و الـنـقل البـحـرى
 كلـية الهـندسة و التكنـولـوجيـا
 الآلى قـسـم هنـدسة الحـاسب
 
نحو التعرف على الميتامورفيك فيروس باستخذام 
  فيروس -آيجن
 لوتطلبات درجةرضالة هقذهة كإضتيفاء جسئً 
 الماجستير فى هنذسة الحاسب
 
 هقذهة هي
 صـطـفى السـيد محمد تكرونى صالحـم 
 ربية للعلىم و التكنىلىجيا و النقل البحريـبكالىريىش هنذضة الحاضب بالأكاديوية الع
 
 الوشرفىى
  د. أحمذ عبذ النبى
 
هذينة هبارك للأبحاث العلوية و ، أضتار هطاعذ
التكنىلىجية، هعهذ بحىث الوعلىهاتية، التطبيقات 
 رئيص قطن الشبكات و التشغيل الوىزع
 أ.د. عبذ الباعث محمذ محمذ
 
 أضتار بكلية الهنذضة و التكنىلىجيا
 قطن هنذضة الحاضب
 الأكاديوية العربية للعلىم و التكنىلىجيا
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